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ABSTRACT 
Today, boards of directors are being examined as never before for their independence, 
integrity and effectiveness. The belief seems to be that independent directors will strengthen 
corporate boards by monitoring the actions of management and ensuring that management 
decisions are made in the best interest of the shareholders. Independent directors are now 
expected to make a more formal contribution to corporate governance than before. The 
importance of good governance is emphasized by both the USA and the UK governments’ 
call for trustees and fund managers to intervene more proactively in the governance of 
companies, particularly in the light of dramatic examples of corporate failure such as Enron 
in the US and Parmalat in Italy where shareholder values have evaporated. Companies failed 
due to accounting scandals and the inability of the board to control a dominant and powerful 
chief executive officer. It is thus no secret that investors are looking increasingly to the 
independent directors on boards to be more effective in protecting their interests. 
This literature study aims to identify international best practice concerning the role of the 
board and more particularly that of the independent director in ensuring good corporate 
governance. The study is based on sources which include a large contingent of up to date 
sources on the subject ranging from newspaper articles, journal articles, various corporate 
governance codes, company reports and reports on governance such as Cadbury and Higgs.  
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND TO THE STUDY 
1.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
Corporate governance has attracted a considerable amount of attention over the past decades, 
leading to recommended codes and best practices globally (Tricker, 1994). After spectacular 
high profile corporate collapses there are many debates concerning the effectiveness of 
corporate governance systems across continents, these include the controversy concerning the 
role of the board, the proposed role of the independent director, along with calls for a greater 
“stakeholder “approach to governance.  
 
While most of the corporate governance debates and research have focused on the USA, there 
is a growing trend in international literature on corporate governance about the role of the 
independent director (Hoskisson, 1998; Davis and Kay, 1990; Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; 
Styles and Taylor, 2001; Weir and Laing, 2001). Internationally, many corporate governance 
codes and guidelines of best practices have been published by national agencies (the Cadbury 
Committee, 1992; the King Report I, 1994; the OECD Principles, 1999; the German Code, 
2000; the UK Combined Code, 2000; the King Report II, 2002; and the Higgs Report, 2003). 
According to the aforementioned writers, many of these codes have been revised since the 
spectacular collapse of Enron and other high profile corporations. Tricker (1994) contends 
that because of evidence published, it reflects the great importance that governments, 
business and communities alike attached to this subject area. Tricker (1994) states that many 
of the codes developed perceived that good corporate governance is very important in 
assuring accountability and improving organizational performance. 
 
According to King (2002) these codes and guidelines make recommendations on appropriate 
board structures and processes that protect the interests of the owners, and reconcile it with 
those of management and other stakeholders, including the communities in which they 
operate. King (2002) argues that good governance practices enable corporations to use their 
capital efficiently, maintain the confidence of investors and attract more, long-term capital. 
With the collapse of major companies in the United Kingdom, United States, and in South 
Africa, questions have been raised about the role of the board and the effectiveness of 
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independent or non-executive directors to protect the interest of not only the shareholders, but 
all stakeholders.  
 
For example, the Cadbury Report (1992) emphasized the contribution that independent non-
executive directors could make, stating that: “The committee believes that the caliber of the 
non-executive members of the board is of special importance in setting and maintaining 
standards of corporate governance”. McKinsey and Company (2002) highlights that investors 
believe companies should create more independent boards and achieve greater boardroom 
effectiveness through better director selection, more disciplined board evaluation processes 
and greater commitment from directors. 
According to Berle and Means (1932) the separation of ownership and management in public 
companies contributes to the agency problem. They also argued that less well informed 
owners could not monitor the decisions made by better-informed managers. They posit that 
the belief in the problem of separation of ownership and management goes back to Adam 
Smith’s argument that hired managers exert less “anxious vigilance” than owners. This 
reasoning of Berle and Means has led to the assumption that good corporate governance is 
dependent on the ability of owners to exercise control over corporate insiders and 
management. It is for these reasons that the agency theory perspective on corporate 
governance requires a high level of board independence in order to benefit shareholders and 
increase company profits. 
 
However, not all researchers are in agreement with the agency perspective in that it results in 
conflict between owners and managers (Zahra and Pearce, 1989). According to Donaldson 
and Davies (1997) stewardship researchers, among others, have criticized the agency theory 
for overstating the case that managers merely seek to maximize personal wealth, even at the 
expense of owners. In contrast, stewardship theory claims that managers are essentially 
trustworthy individuals and therefore good stewards of the resources entrusted to them. 
Increasing board independence by adding more independent non-executives to the board is 
one of the strongest recommendations of public policy reports on corporate governance. In 
South Africa the King Report (2002) with specific reference to independent directors, 
suggests that a majority of non- executive directors should be independent of management. 
This view is also reflected in the listing requirements of major stock exchanges.  
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The next section deals with corporate governance related theories that have been developed 
to provide a greater understanding of corporate governance that will give context to the 
relevance and contribution of independent non-executive directors on the board of directors. 
In order to have a better understanding of corporate governance it is appropriate to define and 
clarify a number of corporate governance terminologies. 
1.2 CORPORATE GOVERNANCE TERMINOLOGY 
1.2.1 Corporate Governance 
According to Naidoo (2002), corporate governance has become an issue of global 
importance, but exactly what constitutes corporate governance and precisely where its 
boundaries lie are still subjects to be debated. She argues that corporate governance is 
essentially the practice by which companies are managed and controlled. It encompasses; 
• The creation and ongoing monitoring of a system of checks and balances to ensure a 
balance of power within a company; 
• The implementation of a system to ensure compliance by the company with its legal 
and regulatory obligations; 
• The implementation of processes whereby risks to the sustainability of the company’s 
businesses are identified and managed and 
• The development of practices which make and keep the company accountable to the 
broader society in which it operates. 
Naidoo contends that corporate governance is essentially about the responsible leadership of 
companies. According to her, this is leadership that is transparent, answerable and 
accountable towards the company’s identified stakeholders. Furthermore, she contends that 
corporate governance aims to achieve a balance between economic, social, individual and 
collective goal, seeking to align as closely as possible the interest of individuals, the company 
and society as a whole. 
 
1.2.2 Board of Directors 
A board of directors is a group of people from within the organization, and nominated and 
selected from outside the organization to represent the interest of shareholders. Directors 
from within the organization are referred to as executive directors and those from outside the 
organization as non-executive directors.  
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1.2.3 Executive Director 
These are people such as the chief executive officer who are involved in the day to day 
management and/or in the full-time employ of the company, and/or any of its subsidiaries. 
 
1.2.4 Non-Executive Director 
These are people who are nominated and selected and approved at the shareholders meetings 
and are not involved in the day to day management of the company and are not full-time 
salaried employees of the company or any of its subsidiaries. 
 
1.2.5 Non-Executive Independent Director 
 
The Cadbury (1992), King (2002) and Higgs (2003) reports stress that the board should 
include independent non-executives of sufficient caliber and number for their views to carry 
significant weight in the board’s deliberations. A non-executive director is considered 
independent when the board determines that he/she director is independent in character and 
judgement and there are no relationships or circumstances which could affect, or appear to 
affect, his/her judgement. Such relationships or circumstances would include where the 
director: 
• Is a former employee of the company or group until five years of employment has 
ended; 
• Has, or has had within the last three years, a material business relationship with the 
company either directly, or as a partner, shareholder, director or senior employee of a 
body that has such a relationship with the company; 
• Has received or receives additional remuneration from the company apart from being 
a director’s fee, participates in the company’s share option or a performance related 
pay scheme, or is a member of the company’s pension scheme; 
• Has close family ties with the company’s advisers, director’s or senior employees; 
• Holds cross-directorships or has significant links with other directors through 
involvement in other companies or bodies; 
• Represents a significant shareholder; or 
• Has served on the board. 
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According to Cadbury (1998) and Higgs (2003), the board should identify in its annual report 
the non-executive directors it determines to be independent. The board they argue should also 
state its reasons if a director is considered to be independent notwithstanding the existence of 
relationships or circumstances which may appear to be relevant to its determination.  
 
1.2.6 AGENCY THEORY 
Agency theory argues that in the modern corporation, in which share ownership is widely 
held, managerial actions depart from those required to maximize shareholder returns (Berle 
and Means, 1932, Pratt and Zeckhauser 1985). According to the agency theory, the owners 
are the principals and the managers are the agents. The non-alignment of the objectives of the 
principles and agents could lead to agency loss which is the extent to which returns to the 
residual claimants, the owners, and fall below what they would be if the principals, the 
owners exercised direct control of the corporation (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). 
According to Eisenhardt (1989) mechanisms which can reduce agency loss include incentive 
schemes for managers which reward them financially for maximizing shareholders’ interest. 
Such schemes typically include plans whereby senior executives obtain shares at a reduced 
price, thus aligning the financial interest of executives with those of the shareholders.  
Pivotal to the development of the agency theory is the argument that shareholders have lost 
effective control of large corporations as they have grown in size. Mizruchi (1983) is of the 
view that as early leaders died or retired, the subsequent dispersion of shareholdings left a 
void filled by the insiders running the day to day activities of the organization. According to 
Mizruchi (1983), professional managers were the only ones with the specialised knowledge 
necessary to operate the company, which meant they gradually gained effective control. 
According to Fama and Jensen (1983), from an agency perspective, it is critical that 
organizations have boards of directors independent of management influence in order to 
achieve maximum performance. They are of the view that the only way for the board to 
achieve independent control is by separating the initiation and implementation of decisions. 
They argue that independent boards are more effective at enforcing such a separation and 
therefore independent boards have a positive effect on the company. 
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1.2.7 STEWARDSHIP THEORY 
The stewardship model is one based on the premise that a manager is a “steward” rather than 
the self-interested rationale economic man of agency theory (Perrow, 1986:234). According 
to Perrow, stewardship theory recognizes a range of non-financial motives for managerial 
behaviour. These include:  
• The need for achievement and recognition;  
• The satisfaction of successful performance; 
• Respect for authority; and  
• The work ethic.    
According to Donaldson and Davis (1991), managers are viewed as interested in achieving 
high performance and capable of using a high level of discretion to act for the benefit of 
shareholders. Stewardship theory they posits that a manager, when confronted with a course 
of action seen as personally unrewarding, may comply based on a sense of duty and 
identification (Etzioni, 1975). 
Stewardship theory argues that the reallocation of corporate control from owners to 
professional managers may be a positive development toward managing the complexity of 
the modern corporation. However, the model completely disregards the additional value that 
non-executive directors add.  
According to research done by Pfeffer, the value of non-executive directors is not as much 
how they influence managers, but how they influence constituencies of the firm. Turnbull 
(1997), is of the opinion that the more regulated an industry is the more outsiders were 
present on the board to reassure the regulators, bankers, and other interest groups. 
Stewardship theory, Pfeffer argues, emphasizes the firm’s ability to build strong common 
interests between the various stakeholders (owners, the board and top management). 
1.2.8 STAKEHOLDER THEORY 
According to Freeman (1984) and Blair (1995) the major challenge to the principal-agent or 
stewardship model stems from the stakeholder model, which claims that the firm should serve 
a wider interest of stakeholders rather than shareholders only. Stakeholders such as 
employees, creditors, suppliers, customers and local communities have long-term 
relationships with the firm and affect its long-term success. 
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Freeman, (1984) and Blair (1895) argue that it is their welfare that must be taken into account 
especially when it comes to corporate decision making. They also believe that the current 
corporate governance system in the Anglo-American environment fails to encourage 
stakeholder involvement with the firm, including inter-firm cooperation and employee 
participation. 
1.2.9 MANAGERIAL HEGEMONY 
According to Huse (2007), the theory of managerial hegemony describes the board as a legal 
fiction, viewing it as formerly but not genuinely the principal governance body of the 
corporation. He argues that despite the board’s formal governing power over management, it 
is in reality dominated by corporate management. The author posits that boards are creatures 
of the chief executive officer (CEO) and in practice he says, the task of boards are really to 
enhance the welfare of the CEO. The writer contends there is a lack of independence 
associated with the board members, the selection of outside board members being controlled 
by management. 
According to Huse (2007) managerial hegemony is a descriptive theory, and it describes the 
consequences that have evolved from property rights theory and the legal perspectives. Huse 
posits that research done shows that the time constraints that part-time board members labour 
under in performing their work, with the result that they tend to be passive until a crisis 
occur. Based on the above introduction and background the objectives of the study are 
outlined below. 
1.3 PRIMARY AND SECONDARY OBJECTIVES OF THE RESEARCH STUDY 
 
1.3.1 The Primary Research Objective 
To conduct a literature review with regard to the role of the independent non-executive 
director on the board of directors.  
1.3.2 Secondary Research Objectives 
To review current international and national corporate governance literature to ascertain: 
• The role and functions/responsibilities of a board of directors; 
• The role of individual directors; and 
• The role and responsibilities of an independent non-executive director.  
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1.4 RESEARCH METHOD 
This paper will explore previous research studies and findings about corporate governance 
and the role of the non-executive independent director to obtain a more contemporary 
academic understanding of what the role of an independent director should be. The study is of 
a exploratory and descriptive nature and will include a large contingent of up-to-date sources 
on the subject ranging from newspaper articles, journals, various corporate governance codes 
and electronic sources. 
1.5 STRUCTURE OF THE RESEARCH STUDY PROJECT 
This research study project commences with an introduction and background to the major 
issues in corporate governance internationally.  
Chapter two provides a review of literature relevant to the research project and discusses the 
theoretical framework which is used to organize the research. 
Chapter three provides a critical assessment of the proper role of the independent non-
executive internationally as defined in the literature as well as views on the role of the board. 
Chapter four provides a detailed analytical discussion on the proposed role of the independent 
director.  
Chapter five provides a summary of the results of the research project, conclusions and 
recommendations.  
1.6 SUMMARY 
 This chapter has presented concepts and issues relating to the stakeholder and various 
corporate governance theories and definitions. It was seen that corporate governance is 
concerned with the nature and interactions and relationships between the company and its 
various stakeholders in the process of decision making and in terms of control over the 
company’s available resources. Corporate governance, thus, has to be understood as the 
interactions between internal stakeholders and the board members who are running the 
company for the benefit of all stakeholders.  
However, to understand corporate governance in a specific company it is necessary to 
identify and understand the behavior of the main actors, including the board members, 
external actors and internal actors, and the context in which governance take place.  
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Extensive efforts have been made in recent years to develop codes of best practice for 
corporate governance and to regulate the rules in order to achieve some kind of accountability 
and reliability.  
Agency theory, stewardship and stakeholder theories have undoubtedly assisted us to 
understand the role that directors may play in contributing to the performance of the 
organizations they govern. According to Jensen and Meckling (1983) agency theorists, for 
example, concentrate on the link(s) between board independence and leadership structure and 
various operationalisations of firm performance. This meant that managers now possessed 
superior knowledge and expertise to the firm’s owners and were therefore in a position to 
pursue self-interested action at the expense of shareholders. On the contrary, Donaldson and 
Davis (1991) contend that stewardship theory focuses on the proportion of insiders on the 
board to investigate links with corporate performance.  
 
In contrast to agency theory, stewardship theory posits that managers are essentially 
trustworthy individuals and this makes them good stewards of the resources entrusted to 
them.  Corporate governance codes and how they relate to the independent director are 
covered in chapter two.  
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CHAPTER TWO 
 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: AN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
In this chapter a review of the literature with regard to international corporate governance 
codes and guidelines is presented.  The literature review provides insight as to why these 
codes and guidelines are important and their relation to the independent director. It will also 
be determined how the various codes and guidelines contribute to seeing the important role of 
the independent director from different perspectives and with differing emphasis. 
Over the past decades corporate governance has attracted considerable attention, leading to 
recommended codes of practice, conceptual models and guidelines. Based on a review of the 
literature, corporate governance is defined for this study as the practice by which companies 
are managed and controlled. Internationally, many corporate governance guidelines and 
codes of best practices have been published by various committees. However, since the latest 
corporate scandals including Enron, World.com and the like, many of these codes have been 
revised in the last few years. 
 
According to the OECD and the Worldbank (1999) corporate codes and guidelines 
commonly perceived as good corporate governance is very important in assuring 
accountability and improving performance. Typically, the guidelines make recommendations 
on appropriate board structures and processes that protect the interests of the owners, and 
reconcile them with those of management and other stakeholders, including the communities 
within which they operate. Good governance practices, they argue, enable companies to use 
their capital efficiently, maintain the confidence of the investors and attract more patient, 
long-term capital. Moreover, it enhances strategic focus, builds market confidence and 
community support, and is an important source of corporate competitive advantage (OECD, 
1999; and World Bank, 1999).  
 
In view of international developments, it is not surprising that South Africa has also placed 
the importance of good corporate governance on its agenda. As was the case with several 
other developing economies, the importance for reform is based on the need for foreign 
capital.  
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One of the major players in the reform of corporate control has been the Institute of Directors 
of South Africa and the Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE).  
This chapter will provide more insight into international corporate governance codes as it 
relates to the independent director and the contributions from USA, Germany, France and a 
South African perspective.  
2.2 CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CODES: AN INTERNATIONAL 
PERSPECTIVE 
2.2.1 The USA Perspective 
Recent high-profile corporate failures such as Enron in the US have underlined the 
continuing need to improve corporate governance globally. These failures have also 
prompted a re-examination of how the US principles of corporate governance might be 
updated to take account of the latest meltdowns of corporate giants. 
According to Garratt (1996), the United States desired the same ends as the United Kingdom. 
that is boards, directors, presidents and chief executive officers should be more open and 
rigorously accountable to their shareholders and stakeholders. As a direct result of the Enron 
collapse major changes were proposed by the regulatory environment. Among the steps that 
have already been taken are: 
• The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has announced plans to create a new 
organization outside the structure of the American Institute of Certified Public 
Accountants (AICPA) to oversee auditors of publicly held companies; 
• The creation of a disciplinary committee to provide more transparency; and 
• The expansion of the authority of the new disciplinary committee to monitor 
compliance with SEC practice Standards, and to refer practices of non-compliance to 
the disciplinary board. 
 
In June of 2002, the SEC proposed to require chief executives to vouch personally for 
financial statements. The New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), acting at the SEC’s request, 
published new proposals to strengthen corporate governance for listed companies. The NYSE 
is however proposing new standards for director independence, along with a requirement that 
all boards contain a majority of these independent directors. Almost all American boards 
already have a large majority of independent directors. Part of the NYSE’s answer to the 
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explosion of accounting scandals among listed companies, for instance, has been to set 
clearer and more detailed qualifications for independent board directors who serve on audit 
committees (Weir and Laing, 2001). 
On 30 July, 2002 President Bush signed into law the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (Sarbanes-
Oxley). Sarbanes-Oxley incorporates many reforms intended to protect investors by 
improving the accuracy and reliability of corporate disclosures. One of the reforms requires 
companies listed on the major stock exchanges to maintain audit committees composed 
entirely of outside independent directors. 
Furthermore, on 4 November 2003 the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) approved 
changes to the corporate governance requirements of the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) 
and the National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD). Similar changes were approved 
on 1 December 2003 by the SEC for the American Stock Exchange (AMEX). However, these 
changes go beyond Sarbanes-Oxley and require companies to maintain boards of directors 
that are composed of a majority of outside independent directors as well as requiring 
companies to maintain fully independent audit committees. Additionally, the changes would 
require companies to either maintain fully independent compensation and nominating 
committees or make provisions whereby executive compensation as well as director 
nominees is determined by a majority of independent directors.  
According to Petra (2005), it is clear that lawmakers in Congress and regulatory agencies 
such as the SEC believe that independent directors will strengthen corporate boards of 
directors. According to the NYSE, the changes are designed to ‘‘further the ability of honest 
and well-intentioned directors, officers, and employees of listed issuers to perform their 
functions effectively’’. According to NASD, the changes ‘‘will enhance investor confidence 
in companies that list on NASDAQ’’ The belief seems to be that independent directors will 
monitor the actions of management and ensure that management decisions are made in the 
best interests of the shareholders.  
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2.2.1.1 The Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act was introduced in the United States in 2002. According to Huse 
(2007), it was, essentially, a result of political expedience and uneasy compromise following 
the scandals such as Enron and Tyco and contained few of the ingredients of considered 
public policy.  
Nonetheless, its introduction was to be the largest incursion ever of state control into matters 
of corporate governance. Previously, public policy on corporate governance in the United 
States had mainly been referred to in state laws. Its main practical content concerns auditors, 
disclosure and the protection of whistleblowers.  
2.2.2 The United Kingdom (UK) Perspective 
According to Weir and Laing (2001), the governance of companies has been the subject of 
increasing interest in recent years given the concerns expressed about the standards of 
accountability and financial reporting of UK listed companies.  
This resulted in a number of investigations and reports which have subsequently been 
published, by amongst others, Cadbury (1992), Greenbury (1995) and Hampel (1998). All 
three investigators called for greater transparency and accountability in areas such as board 
structure and operation, directors’ contracts and also the establishing of board monitoring 
committees. They also stressed the importance of the non-executive independent directors’ 
monitoring role.   
2.2.2.1 Cadbury Report (1992) 
The Cadbury Report (1992) included all the major elements and sub-committees familiar in 
today’s public company board. In addition, Cadbury explicitly stated that the role of the non-
executive director was two-fold:  
• Reviewing the performance of the board and executives and  
• Taking the lead where potential conflicts of interest arise. 
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Some of the main recommendations made, are as follows: 
• That the majority of non-executive directors should be independent of management 
and free from any business or other relationship which could materially interfere with 
the exercise of their independent judgment” (Parkinson, 1998). 
• Non-executives should be appointed for specified terms; 
• Executive remuneration should be subject to the recommendations of a remuneration 
committee made up entirely or mainly of non-executive directors, and an audit 
committee, comprising of at least three non-executive directors should be 
established.  
2.2.2.2 Greenbury Report (1995) 
The Greenbury report (1995) was published three years after the Cadbury Report and 
addressed the role of the non-executive directors and expanded on their roles and 
responsibilities and directors’ remunerations.  
Specifically, four main issues were dealt with, which are as follows: 
• The role of a remuneration committee in setting the remuneration packages for the 
CEO and other directors; 
• The required level of disclosure needed by shareholders regarding details of directors’ 
remuneration and whether there is the need to obtain shareholder approval; 
• Specific guidelines for determining a remuneration policy for directors; and  
• Service contracts and provisions binding the company to pay compensation to a 
director, especially in the event of dismissal for unsatisfactory performance. 
2.2.2.3 Hampel Report (1998) 
The Hampel Committee was established in 1996 to review and revise the earlier 
recommendations of the Cadbury and Greenbury Committees. The report emphasized the 
value of principles rather than legislation and focused on the measures considered necessary 
to improve the effectiveness of the board. Hampel added further expectations and 
responsibilities to the role of the non-executive director, making it clear that they have a 
strategic as well as monitoring role. 
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2.2.2.4 The Combined Code (1998) 
The Combined Code consolidated the principles and recommendations of the Cadbury, 
Greenbury and Hampel committees. It was formulated in 1998 and revised in 2003 following 
the publication of the Higgs report. Stock Exchange listed companies were required to make 
a two part disclosure statement on their adherence to the Combined Code: 
• The first part of the disclosure statement required a company to report on how it 
applies the principles of corporate governance; 
• The second part required a company to confirm that it complies with the individual 
provisions or to provide explanations where the provisions were not adhered to;  
 
Essentially, the approach of the Combined Code was to insist on the disclosure of all 
important aspects of corporate governance structures and practices, and to stress that 
shareholders needed to recognize that there will be instances where departures from the code 
provisions are justifiable and that at least one third of the board must be non-executive 
directors. 
2.2.2.5 The Higgs Report (2003) 
The corporate failures in the United Kingdom and the numerous failures in the United States 
of America, prompted the government to appoint Sir Derek Higgs, a banker at UBS, and non-
executive of EGG, to review corporate governance in the UK and in particular the role and 
responsibilities of independent directors.  
The report recommended a number of changes to the combined code and a revision of the 
code in July 2003 incorporated into most of Higgs recommendations. The main purpose of 
the report was to examine the role, independence and recruitment of non executive directors. 
According to the author, the Combined Code recommended that boards should comprise of at 
least one-third non-executive directors, a majority of whom should be independent. 
Higgs (2003) believes the boards of UK listed companies should exercise greater 
accountability, and will result in non-executive directors having a more demanding and 
influential role.  Higgs suggested that at least half of the directors to be independent of the 
executives.  
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The report further establishes independence requirements and proposes due diligence before 
appointment of non-executive directors in relation to knowledge, skills and experience. Non-
executive directors will also on appointment have to ensure that they have sufficient time to 
meet their obligations. 
Other important recommendations of the Higgs report include: 
• The board should review its performance, the performance of its committees and 
individual directors at least once a year; 
• The company secretary should be accountable to the board through the chairperson on 
all governance matters; and 
• The terms of reference of the remuneration committee should be published. 
2.2.3 The French Perspective 
According to Wirtz (2001), the French attitude towards business distinguishes itself from a 
monistic representation of the firm, that is to say, one that would be exclusively focused on 
shareholder interests. In 1995, Marc Viénot, a former CEO of one of France’s most important 
banks, published a report on corporate governance which benefited from widespread attention 
in the French business community. It stipulates the “obligation” of the board of directors “to 
act in all circumstances in the social interest of the firm”. The report then goes on to 
explicitly distinguish this perspective from an approach purely guided by the maximization of 
shareholder value.  
Mallin (2005) contends that most French companies are incorporated as a société à 
responsabilité limitée (SARL) and are managed by a general manager, answerable to 
shareholders. Larger and quoted companies are incorporated as a société anonyme (SA), led 
by a président director general (chairperson/chief-executive) who has virtually absolute 
power.  The AFG-ASFFI code recommends that the roles of chairman and CEO should be 
separated; the code also recommends that one third of directors should be ‘independent’, that 
is, with no conflict of interest.  According to Mallin (2006), the code also endorses the Viénot 
recommendation for standing committees of the board, on consisting primarily of 
independent directors.  
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2.2.4 The German Perspective 
According to Du Plessis (2001), in Germany the introduction of a code of good corporate 
governance practices was always seen in the context of the broader definition of corporate 
governance. Du Plessis posits that the approach to such a definition was a realistic one, with 
two aspects being highlighted. Firstly, corporate governance could not ignore the stakeholder 
debate and, secondly, the concept of corporate governance encompassed more than just the 
creation of legal structures for decision making and supervising the corporation.  
It was furthermore realised that because of the peculiarities of the German corporation’s law, 
in particular the prescriptive nature of the Aktiengesetz (AktG) regarding a two-tier board, no 
international code would fit the German situation perfectly.  
Du Plessis (2001), states that the vast differences between the OECD principles of good 
corporate governance and the UK Combined Code, served as a clear illustration that no 
international code could really serve as example for Germany.  
Soon after the release of the Baums report it was made known that a group of experts would 
be appointed to draft a code of best practices for Germany applying to all listed German 
corporations and it was indicated that the code should follow  the “comply or explain” 
principle adopted in the UK.  
This task was given to a Corporate Governance Commission under the chairmanship of Dr 
Gerhard Cromme (the Cromme Commission), who was appointed in September 2001. One of 
the main aims of the Code was to improve corporate governance practices relating to 
managing, directing and overseeing listed corporations. The code adopted the two basic 
principles that referred to the above, namely, that it would basically only apply to listed 
corporations and that it would not be mandatory, but that listed corporations should explain if 
they do not follow certain specific recommendations of the Code.  
What is different from most other systems where voluntary corporate governance codes were 
adopted, is that in Germany the obligation to comply with the German code or to explain 
non-compliance was introduced into the German law through a statutory provision, section 
161 of the Aktiengesetz (AktG).  
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Section 161 basically puts a statutory duty on supervisory boards and management boards of 
all listed German corporations to state that they ‘comply’ with the German Code as published 
electronically by the Standing Corporate Governance Commission or to ‘explain’ if they do 
not comply with the Code.  
The comply-or-explain statement according to Du Plessis (2001) had to be done on an annual 
basis and also be made available to the shareholders at all times. Du Plessis argued that such 
a voluntary corporate governance model provided the advantage of responding quickly and 
effectively to constantly changing needs of businesses, something that cannot be achieved if 
corporate governance practices are formalized through legislation, especially because of the 
tediousness involved in amending legislation. 
2.2.5 The South African Perspective 
The King Committee on corporate governance published the King Report on corporate 
governance for South Africa-2002 (King II Report) at an Institute of Directors (IoD) 
Conference on 26 March 2002 (The draft’s second report on corporate governance was 
released by Judge Mervyn King’s committee in July 2001). The report finally provided 
corporate South Africa with a world class code of conduct.  
According to Judin ( in Directors Monthly, June 2003) it is to South Africa’s great credit that 
the country has enshrined one of the most liberal and certainly most community orientated 
constitutions anywhere in the world, resulting in almost half of South Africa’s statute books 
to be re-written. This inevitably made it necessary for the committee to revise the King 1 
report published in (1994) and the second report was published in March, 2002. The purpose 
of the King report1994 and the King report on corporate governance 2002 is to promote high 
standards of corporate governance in South Africa. 
The report highlights the difficulties for companies to account for profitability alone and 
underlines the move from the single to the triple bottom line which embraces the economic, 
environmental, and social aspects of a company’s activities.  
The report also illustrates what can be regarded as constituting the seven characteristics of 
good corporate governance, namely: discipline, transparency, independence, accountability, 
corporate responsibility, fairness and social responsibility.   
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Today the majority share owner is the person in the street, collectively represented by the 
financial institutions. Institutions are becoming more active in keeping a close check on their 
investments, and in this regard have a greater duty towards their ultimate beneficiaries than 
towards company directors.  
There are proposals in the UK, that if institutions do not check the quality of governance in 
the corporations in which they invest, the authorities will consider passing regulations to 
ensure investor vigilance. South Africa is already seeing a similar movement towards 
shareowner activism (www.thecorporatelibrary.com). 
Over and above the financial and regulatory aspects of corporate governance, the King 
Report advocated an integrated approach to good governance in the interests of a wide range 
of stakeholders. According to Judin (2003), the King II report acknowledges that there is a 
move away from the single bottom line (that is, profit for shareholders) to a triple bottom 
line, which embraces the economic, environmental and social aspects of a company's 
activities. 
Table 2.1 presents a summary of some of the major reports or guidelines that have made 
recommendations concerning board composition. While remaining silent on issues of board 
size, these reports do recommend that the roles of chairman and CEO be separated and that 
outside and/or independent directors represent at least a majority on the board.  All of these 
reports mentioned have aimed at improving the standard of accountability and maximizing 
shareholder value. Also they were driven by the objective of improving performance 
standards thereby helping in access to capital. 
2.3 SUMMARY 
International guidelines perceive that good corporate governance assures accountability, 
improves performance and is a source of competitive advantage. This chapter have presented 
concepts relating to the stakeholders and various corporate governance codes theories and 
definitions. It was seen that corporate governance is concerned with the nature and 
interactions and relationships between the company and its various stakeholders in the 
process of decision-making and in terms of control over the company’s available resources.  
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Corporate governance, thus, have to be understood as the interactions between internal 
stakeholders, external stakeholders and the board members who are running the company for 
the benefit of all stakeholders.  
However, to understand corporate governance in a specific company it is necessary to 
identify and understand the behavior of the main actors, including the board members, 
external stakeholders and internal stakeholders, and the context in which governance take 
place. Extensive efforts have been made in recent years to develop codes of best practice for 
corporate governance, to regulate the rules in order to achieve some kind of accountability 
and responsibility. Compliance with all of these guidelines should improve company 
performance and significantly reduce the risk of business failure for reasons other than 
commercial viability. 
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Table 2.1: Summary of International Corporate Governance Codes and Guidelines. 
Country Report        Recommendations      
Size of board  CEO duality           Outside directors   Independent 
            directors 
USA  NYSE, 2002  Board to determine The two roles should   N / A    Majority 
        be separate 
UK  Cadbury Report  N / A   The two roles should  minimum of 3   Majority 
  (Committee on the     be separate         
  Financial Aspects              
  of Corporate                
  Governance, 1992) 
UK  Higgs Report  Board should include The two roles should  N / A    Substantial 
  (Review of the role a balance of executive  be separate       majority 
  and effectiveness of  and non-executive           
  Non-Executive  directors            
  Directors, 2003) 
France  Vienot Code  10-16, board to  The   board should  N / A    One third of the 
  ( 1995)   determine  determine       board. 
Germany Baums Report  Two tier board  Supervisory board  N / A    Majority on 
  (2000)   20 members          audit committee 
South Africa KingII (Report on Board should include The two roles should   N / A    Majority 
  Corporate   a balance of executive  be separate         
  Governance for  and non executive           
  South Africa, (2002) directors            
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CHAPTER THREE 
LITERATURE REVIEW: THE BOARD AND THE INDEPENDENT DIRECTOR 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter will focus on the types of boards and the key relationships within the board; 
between a chairperson and chief executive director; between executive and non-executive 
directors, and in particular the role of the independent non-executive director in influencing these 
relationships and promoting teamwork within the board of directors. 
High-profile business failures such as Enron Corp., WorldCom, Inc., and Global Crossing, Ltd. 
have focused the public’s attention on how management manipulates earnings in an attempt to 
deceive the unwary public. Public confidence in corporate governance structures and the ability 
of corporate boards to monitor and control management’s behavior has eroded to very low levels 
(Petra, 2005). 
Boards are being forced to deal with tough questions: such as how much is enough when it 
comes to paying the executive? What is the best way to account for option grants? What kind of 
ties should be banned between directors and the companies they oversee? On how many boards 
that directors serve can they add value? How should the audit committee be compiled? And how 
much additional consulting, if any, is acceptable for the outside accounting firm? The recent 
scandals have made it clear that the decisions boards have to make on the above issues can have 
disastrous consequences for their companies (Lavelle, 2002). 
According to the Cadbury report (1992), corporate governance is about implementing and 
improving the governance structures and processes of companies to improve their performance 
and make them more accountable to shareholders and other stakeholders. It covers issues such as 
the structure and operation of the board of directors, financial reporting, transparency and audit, 
separation of powers and minority shareholders’ rights. In the same vein, South Africa has seen 
the King II report dominating the corporate governance debate in South Africa.  
It is clear that recent upheavals in the corporate world have sparked a discussion on the role of 
the boards in general and independent non-executive directors in particular. 
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3.2 TYPES OF BOARDS 
Garratt (1996) identified four board structures that are typically used, these are: 
• The Non-Executive Board -According to the author this type of board comprises 
notionally independent non-executive directors who decide policy and strategy that is 
then delegated to the chief executive for implementation.  
 
• The chief executive wields enormous power in controlling the information flowing to and 
from the board. This Garratt argues could have a huge potential for corruption. Such 
board structures are common in the USA, New Zealand and among public and semi-
public service boards; 
 
• The Executive Board -According to Garratt (1996) this is the most common type of 
board, found in family companies, owner directed businesses and the subsidiaries of 
multi and transnational companies around the world. The structure of this board allows 
for the dominance of the chief executive who also adopts the role of the chairperson. This 
type of structure is characterised by a lack of diversity and a cloning of membership is. 
Garratt strongly suggests that influence of the external independent director is lacking; 
 
• Two-Tier Boards-This board structure comprises an upper ‘board’ which deals with the 
policy and strategic issues and a lower ‘board’ which represents the different interest in 
the company. Garratt argues that the separateness of the boards can prove to be 
problematic as it allows political issues to dominate board discussions. He further argues 
that both boards can lose sight of working towards a common goal. This structure is 
common to Germany, France and The Netherlands and has been proposed as a model for 
boards in the European Union; and 
 
• The Unitary Board-This structure represents the traditional Anglo-Saxon model. 
According to Garratt it assumes that all directors are equal and must accept the same 
responsibilities and liabilities for the performance of the organization. This type of board 
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is led by the chief executive or managing director who is responsible for the operations of 
the business. Independent non-executive directors formulate policy, ensure accountability 
and provide debate and constructive criticism of the chief executive’s performance. 
Garratt states that such independent directors are crucial to both the “Performance” and 
Conformance” of the unitary board so that the interests of shareholders and other 
stakeholders are heard and protected.  
 
3.3 THE ROLE AND FUNCTION OF THE BOARD 
According to the Higgs Report (2003), the board is collectively responsible for promoting the 
success of the company by directing and supervising the company’s affairs. The board’s role is 
to provide entrepreneurial leadership to the company within a framework of prudent and 
effective controls which enable risk to be assessed and managed. According to Payne (2002), the 
board is the focal point of the corporate governance system.  It is ultimately accountable and 
responsible for the performance and affairs of the company. The author argues that delegating 
authority to board committees or management does not in any way mitigate or dissipate the 
discharge by the board and its directors of their duties and responsibilities. 
Higgs (2003) argues that the board should set the company’s strategic aims, ensure that the 
necessary financial and human resources are in place for the company to meet its objectives, and 
review management performance. Higgs states that the board should set the company’s values 
and standards and ensure that its obligations to its shareholders and others are understood and 
met.  
Furthermore, Higgs is of the view that for a board to be effective it should not be so large as to 
become unwieldy. It should be of sufficient size that the balance of skills and experience is 
appropriate for the requirement of the business and that changes in the board’s composition can 
be managed without undue disruption. The board should ensure that the company complies with 
all relevant laws, regulations and codes of business practice, and that it communicates with its 
shareowners and relevant stakeholders (internal and external) openly and promptly and with 
substance prevailing over form. 
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3.4 BOARD COMPOSITION 
According to Payne (2002), companies should be headed by an effective board that can both lead 
and control the company.  The board should comprise a balance of executive and non-executive 
directors, preferably with a majority of non-executive directors, of whom sufficient should be 
independent of management so that minority interests can be protected. An obvious 
consideration of South African companies would be to consider the demographics in relation to 
the composition of the board. 
Payne (2002) argues that procedures for appointments to the board should be formal and 
transparent, and a matter for the board as a whole, assisted where appropriate by a nomination 
committee.  This committee should constitute only non-executive directors, of whom the 
majority should be independent, and should be chaired by the board chairperson. He contends 
that   board continuity, subject to performance and eligibility for re-election, are imperative and a 
programme ensuring staggered rotation of directors should be put in place by the board to the 
extent that this is not already regulated.  
3.5 DUTIES OF THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS 
According to King (2002), all states define the roles of directors in terms of duties. The major 
duties of directors are: 
• The fiduciary duty-According to the writer central to the role of being director is the 
fiduciary duty- being trustworthy in acting in the best interest of those whom the director 
represents. This duty the writer posits has, the elements of both integrity and competence 
• The duty of loyalty and the duty of fair dealing-The writer contend that by assuming his 
or her office, the corporate director commits allegiance to the company and 
acknowledges that the best interest of the company and the shareholders must prevail 
over any individual director’s self interest. The basic principle of this duty of loyalty is 
that the director should not use his or her corporate position to make a personal profit or 
gain other personal advantages.  
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The duty of fair dealing requires that all transactions with the company be handled in a 
forthright and open manner that is fair to the interest of the company. 
• The duty of care - The duty of care according to King, in general, requires a director to 
act in the best interests of the company and with the care reasonably expected of “an 
ordinary prudent person.” The director also has the duty to be informed and to make the 
necessary inquiries to arrive at this state. According to the writer this duty, allows the 
board to delegate functions to and rely on others, including other directors, officers, 
employees, experts and board committees. 
• The duty of skill - With regards to the duty of skill the King states, it is expected of each 
director that whatever his practiced ability is, he will apply that ability in the interest of 
the company he represents. In making a judgment call, therefore, a director will use his 
skills to ad to the debate around the table. 
• The duty of diligence - According to King (2006), diligence simply means that a director 
must do his homework. The director of a company, or indeed the leader of any entity, 
who comes to the decision- making table without being fully informed about the issues to 
be decided there, and who has not studied the information furnished to him or her in the 
document pack, is not fulfilling their duties. Diligence according to the writer also 
requires that a director understands the issues and information given to him. 
 
3.6  BOARD OF DIRECTOR RELATIONSHIPS 
 
3.6.1 The Chairperson and Chief Executive Officer (CEO) 
 
According to Stiles and Taylor (2001) the relationship between the chairperson and chief 
executive is of crucial importance since it lies at the heart of a network of other associations. 
They are of the view that its quality has knock-on consequences, affecting relationships with 
other board members and the executive team.  
However, the authors believe that many organizations have split the roles of the chairperson and 
chief executive officer in response to the Cadbury recommendations, which stressed the benefits 
of such a division in terms of balancing power and authority at the head of the organization. 
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The authors are of the view that difficulty arises in achieving balance, since the roles are 
ambiguous and tend to overlap. In some cases, they say that the two individuals attempt to 
formalize the relationship through written schedules of roles and responsibilities. Several boards 
constructed formulas such as the chairman being responsible for the board with the chief 
executive responsible for the day-to-day operations of the firm and for managing the 
performance of the executives.  
Stiles and Taylor (2001) argue there is a constant process of negotiation between the two 
individuals over time. If this negotiation is not handled well, if there is defensiveness or mutual 
suspicion, then there is strong potential for the two individuals to slip into a struggle for power. 
According to them a regular meeting, where everything is up for discussion, is the key. If trust is 
achieved, the chief executive officer gains valuable sources of advice and counsel from the 
chairperson. 
3.6.2 The Relationship between Executive Directors and Independent Non-Executive 
Directors 
According to Stiles and Taylor (2001), the unitary board’s mix of executive directors and 
independent non-executives has the potential for both creativity and conflict. They are of the 
view that the executives’ attitude towards independent non-executives ranged from suspicion 
that they were simply policeman on the board who served to provide little in the way of added 
value, to the perception that they provide a valuable service in terms of advice and counsel, as 
well as contracts and sources of external influence. 
However, as members of the board, their role is similar to any other director; Independent 
directors primarily provide inputs to all key-decisions, such as strategies, performance evaluation 
and risk evaluation affecting the company. Significant contribution is expected when matters 
relating to the committee on which they are members are being discussed. They should ensure 
that the board addresses areas of concern in managing the company and that it should be 
recorded in the minutes if not resolved (Stiles and Taylor, 2001). 
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While their legal duties and objectives are the same as executive directors, the time devoted by 
independent non-executive directors to the company’s affairs is significantly less and therefore 
the degree of care, skill and diligence is lower then expected from executive directors.  
Perhaps the single most important role that independent directors play directly in relation to the 
board is the objective view that they bring in while evaluating the board and the management 
decisions, creating a balance in the interest of the shareholders (Styles and Taylor, 2001).  
3.6.3 Managing the Relationships: The Role of the Chairperson 
 According to Higgs (2003), the role of the chairperson is pivotal in creating the conditions for 
overall board and individual non-executive director effectiveness, both inside and outside the 
boardroom. The particular nature of the chairperson’s role will inevitably be shaped by the 
challenges facing the company, its scale and complexity and the nature of its business. The role 
differs significantly from that of other non-executive and executive directors. 
The chairman has the responsibility of leading the board in setting the values and standards of 
the company and of maintaining a relationship of trust with and between the executive and non-
executive members. The chairman needs to foster relationships of trust with both the executive 
and non-executive directors on the board, whilst at the same time maintaining support for, and 
partnership with the CEO. 
The board agenda must take full account of the issues and concerns of all board members for the 
board to be effective. This is the chairperson’s responsibility. The chairperson should also make 
efficient use of board time by ensuring that board agendas are forward looking and concentrate 
on strategy, rather than approving proposals which should be decided by management. 
The chairperson is responsible for managing the business of the board to ensure that sufficient 
time is allowed for discussion of complex or contentious issues and, where appropriate, 
arranging for informal meetings beforehand to enable thorough preparation for board discussion. 
It is particularly important that non-executive directors have sufficient time to consider critical 
issues and are not faced with unrealistic deadlines for decision-making. 
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3.7 THE BOARD AND THE INDEPENDENT DIRECTOR  
According to Lin Pope and Young (2001), the composition of the board and the separation of 
roles of CEO and chairman are some of the key topical issues in the current governance debates.  
One of the major roles of the board of directors is to ensure that the composition of the board is 
representative and enables objectivity, and this implies appointing proportionately more non-
executive directors. 
The non-executive director, who is an independent director, does not serve for the protection of 
management. Independent directors are pivotal to making boards the first line of defense against 
short-term thinking and self dealing schemes by management (Pope and Young, 2000).  
They concluded that it is perhaps no coincidence that such appointments consisted almost 
exclusively of “figurehead” non-executive directors- high profile individuals who lacked detailed 
knowledge of the company’s products and operations and whose availability is severely limited 
as a result of their many other commitments.  
Investor bodies such as the UK National Association of Pension Funds have suggested a limit of 
perhaps four non-executive posts. But Cowe (2002) believes it would be wrong to set a specific 
limit because the demands vary enormously from one board to another.  
One of the major problems with directors of public companies is that they sometimes do not own 
much of the company’s shares. There is a high probability that executive directors would have 
increased their effort if they held more shares. Colvin (2002) ascertained that 64% of (963 of 
1500) of all directors in the USA do not own shares. Another problem which they faced was that 
there were too many inside directors, and therefore has the ability to over-power the independent 
director with regards to important decisions. 
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3.8 THE ROLE OF THE INDEPENDENT DIRECTOR 
What is the role of the Independent director? Essentially the (independent) non-executive 
directors’ role is to provide a creative contribution to the board by providing objective criticism. 
The Cadbury (1992) report initiated a debate about the main functions and responsibilities of 
non-executive directors. Today, it is widely accepted that non-executive directors have an 
important contribution to make to the proper running of companies and, therefore, more widely 
to the economy at large. According to Cadbury, non-executive directors should bring an 
independent judgment to bear on issues of strategy, performance and resources including key 
appointments and standards of conduct.  
Cadbury (1992) states that there is no legal distinction between executive and non-executive 
directors. As a consequence, in the UK unitary board structure, non-executive directors have the 
same legal duties, responsibilities and potential liabilities as their executive counterparts.  
Clearly, it is impossible that non-executive directors cannot give extensive attention to the 
business of the company. However, it is important that they show the same commitment to its 
success as their executive colleagues. All directors should be capable of seeing company and 
business issues in a broad perspective.  
Nonetheless, non-executive directors are usually chosen because they have a wealth of 
experience, are of an appropriate caliber and have particular personal qualities. Additionally, 
they may have some specialist knowledge that will help provide the board with valuable insights 
or perhaps, key contacts in related industries or the City (Financial Times November, 2003).  
The Stock Exchange's Combined Code, that effectively codifies the main features of the Cadbury 
(1992), Hampel (1998) and Higgs (2003) reports for listed companies, advises that the balance of 
executive and non-executive directors should be such that no individual or small group of 
individuals can dominate the board's decision-taking. Non-executive directors should comprise 
not less than half the board. While much of the comment and discussion on non-executive 
directors tends to focus on listed companies, it is important to note that they can also make a 
valuable, albeit somewhat different, contribution to private companies.  
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3.8.1 The Role of the Independent Director towards Shareholders and Stakeholders 
Weir and Lang (2001) is of the view that the shareholders look to independent directors to 
provide transparency in respect of the disclosures in the working of the company as well as 
providing a balance towards resolving conflict areas. In evaluating the board’s or management’s 
decisions in respect of employees, creditors and other suppliers of major services, independent 
directors have a significant role in protecting the stakeholder’s interests. In this regard the audit 
committee is an important committee. 
 According to Weir and Lang (2001), it is one of the mandatory requirements of the audit 
committee to look into the defaults in payments to deposit holders, non-payment of declared 
dividends and creditor’s. Further more they are required to review the function of the “whistle 
blower mechanism” and related party transactions, as it will, safeguard the interests of the 
stakeholders. 
3.8.2 The Role of the Independent Director towards Senior Management 
Weir and Lang (2001) are of the view that independent directors have a direct role in reviewing 
the performance of senior management. According to them many corporate governance 
requirements stress this by providing for their nomination on the remuneration committee, which 
involves review of their performance in relation to remuneration. 
They are of the view that, independent directors add other expertise that is providing guidance to 
the company in developing and implementing its strategic policies. The role of such independent 
directors they argue, takes significant importance in evaluating decisions of the management of 
the company. 
3.8.3 The Role of the Independent Director towards the Board 
According to Weir and Lang (2001), as members of the board, their role is similar to any other 
director, independent directors primarily provide inputs to all key decisions such as strategies, 
performance evaluation and risk evaluation, affecting the organization. Significant contribution 
is expected from them whenever matters relating to the committee are being discussed. 
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They should ensure that the board addresses areas of concern in running the organization and 
that these are recorded in the minutes if not resolved. They argue that while the legal duties and 
objectives are the same as executive directors, the time devoted by independent non-executive 
directors to the organization’s affairs is significantly less and therefore the degree of care, skill 
and diligence is lower than expected from executive directors. 
Perhaps the single most important role that independent directors play directly in relation to the 
board is the objective view that they bring while evaluating the board and the management 
decisions, creating a balance in the interest of the shareholders. 
These areas they say are executive remuneration, succession planning, and changes in corporate 
control during after take-over and acquisition as well as the audit functions. Weir and Lang 
(2001) are of the view that as members of the board, independent directors should, not only 
comply with the code of conduct but also establish, implement, monitor its adherence by other 
senior management and set an example for others. 
3.9 THE INDEPENDENCE OF NON-EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS 
Both the Cadbury (1992) and Hempel (1998) Committee reports recommended that non-
executive directors should be “independent” of the board to ensure objectivity. A non-executive 
director who is, for example, a retired director of his or her serving company, or who works for a 
firm that provides services to the company, may be perceived as less than wholly independent. In 
addition, they argue that, non-executive directors with many years of experience on the same 
board may become less effective monitors as they build close relationships with the executive 
directors. 
According to Moses Mo-Chi Cheng (2005), president of the Hong Kong Institute of Directors 
"independence" does not have superficial meaning it exhibits the attitude toward the job, 
especially under great pressure. This is the primary requirement of an independent non-executive 
director. An independent non-executive director does not have any direct interests in a company, 
but such a person should have independent thinking and independent views, and must take care 
of the interests of all stakeholders rather than the interests of a particular group. In addition, 
he/she has a special task, that is, to protect small shareholders. 
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Cheng (2005) further argues that like any other director, an independent non-executive director 
must be honest, straightforward and impartial toward the company that appointed him/her and 
uses his/her caution, skills and hard work through out the process to influence the operations of 
the company. He/she should basically have the same responsibilities as executive directors, 
including bearing the legal responsibilities. 
It is very important for independent non-executive directors to air their affirmative and objective 
views and take independent decisions. As an independent non-executive director the law 
demands impartiality in taking decisions by taking into account all available information, instead 
of casting votes according to the views of shareholders who were instrumental in the 
appointment of a specific independent non-executive director. 
Cheng contends that first of all, an independent non-executive director must study and get to 
know all the information provided by the company; secondly, the voting and decision taking are 
not influenced, directly or indirectly, by individual interests; thirdly, he must honestly ask 
himself whether any private interests have influenced his judgment and lastly non-executive 
directors must constantly seek to establish and maintain their own confidence in the conduct of 
the company, in the performance of the management team, the development of strategy, the 
adequacy of financial controls and risk management, the appropriateness of remuneration and the 
appointment and replacement of key personnel and plans for management development and 
succession. The role of the non-executive director is therefore both to support executives in their 
leadership of the business and to monitor and supervise their conduct. 
The King II Report (2002) defines an independent director as a non-executive director who: 
• Is not a representative of a shareowner who has the ability to control or significantly 
influence management; 
• Has not been employed by the company or the group of which it currently forms part, in 
any executive capacity for the preceding three financial years; 
• Is not a member of the immediate family of an individual who is, or has been in any of 
the past three financial years, employed by the company or the group, other than in a 
director capacity; 
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• Is not a significant supplier to, or customer of the company or the group; 
• Has no significant contractual relationship with the company or the group; and  
• Is free from any business or other relationship, which could be seen to materially 
interfere with the individual’s capacity to act in an independent manner. 
3.10 SUMMARY 
This chapter has described the nature of relationships within and around the board. It has sought 
to build on the views of independent directors in an attempt to make sense of their roles in large 
organizations. Highlighted, are some of the key contextual and structural features of boards that 
can affect the involvement of the board in the running of the company. These included the roles 
of the independent director, the relationships between the chief executive officer and the 
chairperson, and the relationship between the independent director and various other 
stakeholders.  
According to Westphal (2002), much of the recent and continuing work on corporate governance 
has been concerned with changes in board structure and composition that have sought to increase 
the board’s ability to exercise control. These changes include introducing a sufficient number of 
independent non-executive directors to the boards of organizations, separating the roles of 
chairperson and chief executive officer, and establishing committees of the board.  
The author is of the view that boards that are structurally independent from management are able 
to rein back managerial interest and align them with the interest of shareholders and reduces the 
agency problem. With organizations becoming more complex and the business environment 
unpredictable, the role of the board will come under greater scrutiny. According to Stiles and 
Taylor (2001), structure and composition of the board count for much in terms of how boards are 
run, but at the heart of board’s effectiveness is the caliber of its members, their willingness to 
participate, and the quality of the relationships between them. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
THE PROPOSED ROLE AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE INDEPENDENT 
DIRECTOR 
4.1  INTRODUCTION 
According to the Higgs report (2003), the role of the non-executive director is complex, 
demanding and requires skills, expertise and integrity as well as particular behaviours and 
personal attributes. The author posits that non-executive directors need to be sound in judgment 
and need to have an inquiring mind. Higgs argues that they should question intelligently, debate 
constructively, challenge rigorously, decides dispassionately and that they should listen 
sensitively to the views of others, inside and outside the board. 
In order to fulfill their role he argues that non- executive directors must acquire the necessary 
expertise and knowledge to discharge their responsibilities. They must be well informed about 
the business and the environment in which the business operates he says. This he says requires 
knowledge of the markets in which the company operates as well as a full understanding of the 
company itself.  
According to Higgs (2003), non-executive directors must create the right balance between the 
interest of senior employees, the company and in particular, the shareholders. This sometimes 
means taking an unpopular line and in times of crisis, which most boards have at some stage, the 
non-executive director can play a significant role. He states that non-executive directors can be a 
powerful force in challenging executive directors. 
In view of what has been discussed in the preceding chapter, the role and responsibilities of the 
board and the independent non-executive director has gained special attention. Hence, a review 
of some of the critical outcomes of this attention, having an impact on the proposed role of the 
independent director in corporate governance, is necessary. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
36
4.2 THE BEHAVIOR AND PERSONAL ATTRIBUTES OF THE INDEPENDENT 
DIRECTOR 
Higgs (2003), states that understanding the company well is essential to gain credibility and 
reduces the inevitable disparity in knowledge between executive and non-executive directors. 
Developing such knowledge cannot be done within the confines of the boardroom alone.  
 According to Higgs a number of consultation responses identified the personal attributes 
required of the effective non-executive director. They are founded on: 
• integrity and high ethical standards; 
• sound judgment; 
• the ability and willingness to challenge and probe; and 
• Strong interpersonal skills. 
 First and foremost, integrity, probity and high ethical standards are a prerequisite for all 
directors. Second, sound judgment is central to the non-executive director’s role. This is essential 
for each of the elements of the non-executive director’s role set out above. Third, all non-
executive directors must be able and willing to inquire and probe.  
They should have sufficient strength of character to seek and obtain full and satisfactory answers 
within the collegiate environment of the board. The objectivity and fresh perspective acquired 
through their relative distance from day-to-day matters, combined with experience acquired 
elsewhere, is the basis for questioning and challenging the accepted thinking of the executive. 
Questioning does not only serve to raise specific concerns, it can also prompt stronger executive 
performance.  
Higgs contends that executive directors especially value informed and constructive debate with 
non-executive directors. Fourth, the ability to work with other people is an essential 
characteristic of the effective non-executive director. Much of their effectiveness depends on 
exercising influence rather than giving orders and requires the establishment of high levels of 
trust. Inevitably, the effectiveness of a non-executive director’s contribution will change over 
time. 
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 Non-executive directors should be willing and able to acknowledge when their individual 
contribution is no longer fresh, and should make way for newcomers in an orderly and managed 
way.  
4.3 WHY HAVE INDEPENDENT DIRECTORS ON BOARD? 
According to Gopalakrishnan (2005), there are several distinct benefits that an independent 
board of directors can bring to a company, ranging from long-term survival to improved internal 
controls. The author believes that independent directors on the board can: 
• Counter balance management weaknesses in a company; 
• Ensure legal and ethical behaviour at the company, while strengthening financial 
accounting controls; 
• Extend the “reach” of a company through contacts (social capital), expertise, and access 
to debt (financial capital) and equity capital; 
• Be a source of well conceived, binding, long term decisions for the company; and 
• Help the company survives grow and prosper over time through improved succession 
planning through membership in the nomination committee. 
4.4 THE ROLE OF THE INDEPENDENT DIRECTOR 
According to Clarke (1998), academic research that is consistent with corporate governance 
codes and in particular research on the role of non-executive directors focuses on three main 
roles. These are considered separately below. 
4.4.1 Monitoring the Board 
According to Weir and Lang (2001), it is important that there is a mechanism to monitor the 
actions of the chief executive and other executive directors to ensure that they pursue shareholder 
interests. Dare (1998) contends that non-executive directors are effective as monitors when they 
ask awkward question and that they can provide independent judgment in the areas that 
personally affect the executive directors’ remuneration, appointments and also dismissals. Davis 
and Kay (1990) argue that if there is to be a corporate monitor, then the non-executive director 
appears to be the ideal candidate for such a purpose. 
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4.4.2 Strategy Development 
Tricker (1984) contends that it is generally accepted that boards of directors are involved in the 
formulation of strategy, setting policies and the acquisition and allocation of much needed 
resources. According to Hill (1995), directors see their main purpose as strategic direction and 
non-executive directors sees a wider role for themselves in this area by bringing a breadth of 
vision, experience, environmental scanning and being available as a sounding board for the chief 
executive officer. 
Stiles (2001) posit that the board is responsible for setting the broad strategic parameters within 
which detailed strategic activity takes place. The author also considers the board as the final 
arbiter on key questions such as ‘what business are we in?’, ‘which areas should we go into?’ as 
well as challenging existing strategies and organizational habits that needed to change. As far as 
the extent of the non-executives director involvement in strategy is concerned, Pettigrew and 
McNulty (1995) argued that the role of the independent director was dependent upon the skills 
and motivation of the non-executive directors and other factors such as crisis conditions or 
changing boardroom dynamics.  
4.4.3 Conflict Resolution 
According to Davis and Kay (1990), non-executive directors should be active in matters of 
conflict resolution especially in areas concerning executive remuneration, responses to takeovers 
and the appointment of and removal of executive directors. In a study conducted by McNulty and 
Pettigrew (1996) they found that non-executive directors believed that they were able to make 
significant contributions in the areas of board remuneration, hiring and firing of chairman and 
board members as well as board processes and conduct. 
4.5 THE RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE INDEPENDENT DIRECTOR 
To execute their role, independent directors, have similar responsibilities to those of other 
directors (Gopalakrishnan, 2005). According to the author the fiduciary duties of care, diligence 
and acting in good faith apply equally to independent detectors’ as to other directors. He posits 
that in view of faith imposed on them by various agencies they are more bound to execute their 
functions with impartiality. 
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According to Gopalakrishnan (2005), it is necessary for the independent directors to: 
• Prepare themselves thoroughly for meetings;  
• Be objective in forming decisions relating to the company and its business;  
• Be open minded, free and frank in expressing their opinions and at the same time be 
willing to engage in meaningful debates; 
• Be committed to decisions made as a board; 
• Continuously seek information both from within and if required outside professional 
knowledge to keep abreast with the latest developments in the areas of the company’s 
operations; 
• Be informed on the laws and regulations influencing their functioning as directors; and 
• Utilize the expertise that they possess to the advantage of the company.   
4.6 THE INDEPENDENT DIRECTORS CODE OF CONDUCT 
The following code is a professional conduct guideline for independent directors. According to 
the charter of the independent directors association adherence to these standards by independent 
directors and fulfillment of their responsibilities in a professional and faithful manner promotes 
confidence in the Institution of Independent Directors on behalf of the investment community 
and companies. Implementation of best corporate governance practices by Independent Directors 
in Boards of Directors (Supervisory Boards) of public companies enhances the company 
management efficiency, improves its image and contributes to the overall growth of the 
company's  shareholder value. 
This code is drafted in development of the Code of Corporate Conduct introduced by the Charter 
of the Independent Directors Association. It also takes into account the OECD's Principles of 
Corporate Governance and other best international corporate governance practices. The code 
takes into account the specific legal and business environment of the activity of members of 
Boards of Directors of National and International Corporations.  
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It is recommended to all independent directors working in South African as well as international 
companies. Compliance with this code is compulsory for all association members carrying out 
the functions of an independent director in boards of directors of national and international 
companies. 
4.6.1  Guidelines for professional conduct of an independent director 
• An independent director shall respect the truth and act objectively and constructively in 
exercising his/her duties; 
• An independent director shall exercise his/her responsibilities in a bona fide manner in 
accordance with applicable legislation; 
• In decision-making situations, an independent director shall ensure that the decision 
would benefit the company, its shareholders and other stakeholders, providing a 
reasonable balance of interests; 
• An independent director shall not abuse his/her position to the detriment of the company 
or its shareholders or for the purpose of gaining direct or indirect personal advantage or 
advantage for any other associated person, except for the remuneration for board 
membership; 
• Observance of the independence requirement is the most important aspect of the activity 
of an independent director; and 
• Transparency and openness to dialog are the distinguishing characteristics of an 
independent director. 
 
4.6.2  Professional activities of an independent director: relationship with the company. 
• An independent director shall strive to acquire as soon as possible a sufficiently broad 
knowledge of the company's business in order to work effectively in its board of 
directors; 
• An independent director shall endeavor to make his/her own contribution to the 
company's successful development, image enhancement and growth of the shareholder 
value; 
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• An independent director shall make decisions for the benefit of the company and all of its 
shareholders; 
• In relations with the company, an independent director shall adhere to the principle of 
openness with respect to himself/herself as well as his/her affiliated parties; and 
• An independent director shall be fully aware of all liabilities arising from performance of 
his/her duties as member of the Board of Directors (Supervisory Board) of the company. 
4.6.3  Professional activities of an independent director: relationship with shareholders  
• An independent director acts as an agent of all the company shareholders and therefore 
shall, within the limits of his/her authority, protect the rights and legitimate interests of all 
of the company's shareholders and help establish constructive dialog between the 
company's shareholders and management; 
• An independent director shall endeavor to ensure that shareholders are given access to 
corporation information; and 
• An independent director shall strive to be accessible and open to shareholders. 
 
4.6.4  Professional activities of an independent director: relationship with third parties. 
• When dealing with third parties, an independent director shall be loyal to the company 
and its shareholders and protect their interests; 
• When dealing with the investment community and stock market analysts, an independent 
director shall make every possible effort to enable all the parties concerned to have 
simultaneous access to the information disclosed; and 
• An independent director shall disclose only accurate information that may be disclosed 
according under applicable laws and does not damage the company's business. 
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4.7  REMUNERATION OF INDEPENDENT NON-EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS 
According to Higgs (2003), a remuneration committee should look at the overall compensation 
structure of the corporation to determine if it established appropriate incentives for management 
and employees at all levels. The Higgs Report (2003) suggests that the remuneration committee 
should consist exclusively of independent non-executive directors. The author posits that the 
committee should determine and agree with the board a framework or policy for the 
remuneration of the CEO, the board chairperson and other members of the executive 
management that is authorized to consider. Higgs strongly suggests that the remuneration of the 
non-executive director should be determined by the chairperson and the executive members of 
the board.  
4.8  THE ROLE OF THE NOMINATION COMMITTEE 
According to Huse (2007), nomination committees are recommended in most codes of best 
practice, which should lead the process for board appointments and make recommendations to 
the board. Higgs (2003) suggests a nomination committee should have majority of non-
executives, but that the board chairperson should lead the nomination committee. Huse (2007) 
contends there must be a formal, rigorous and transparent procedure for the appointment of new 
board members. 
According to Higgs (2003), it is the task of the nomination committee to evaluate the balance of 
skills, knowledge and experience on the board and, in light of this evaluation, prepare a 
description of the role and capabilities required for a particular appointment. For the nomination 
of a chairperson, the nomination committee should prepare a job specification. 
4.9  SELECTION OF INDEPENDENT NON-EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS 
According to Berry and Perrin (2001), to select a suitably balanced team of directors can prove 
more difficult than it appears. They argue that the selection and appointment of a non-executive 
director is a very important task and that the recruitment of such a person is expensive and needs 
to be taken seriously. They also believe that the board must be clear about the particular skills 
that they want a non-executive director to bring. They are of the view that chemistry is 
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important, as a non-executive director must be able to establish credibility with the board and be 
able to present views perhaps not held by the majority. 
According to Berry and Perrin (2001), the key to any successful appointment is for the Board to 
be clear about the qualities that they are looking for in a potential applicant. They posit that many 
attributes may be desired- integrity, diplomacy, tact experience of business, good judgment and 
financial and commercial acumen. They say the non-executive director must not depend on the 
appointment alone to supplement his income. He or she should not owe any particular allegiance 
to any member of the board, and should be in every way independent. According to the writers 
when selecting a non-executive director, a specification should be drawn up detailing the 
personal and commercial qualities of the individual sought, as well as the particular skills that the 
board would wish the individual to bring. 
4.10 SUMMARY 
Corporate governance has been a controversial issue in recent years. To ensure that the board 
functions as it should, governments around the world increasingly require publicly listed 
companies to appoint and/or increase the number of independent directors on the board. 
According to Cadbury (1992), the non-executive director has a critical role in resolving potential 
conflicts of interest between the company and executives, and in ensuring that there are adequate 
systems to safeguard the interests of the company where such interests may conflict with the 
personal interests of the directors. 
 
Fundamentally, non-executive directors should contribute independent views to the board's 
deliberations and decisions, while identifying strongly with the company's business. Therefore, 
non-executive directors must have the strength of character and be able to stand back from the 
issues being considered, and the ability to exercise impartial judgment on conflicts or potential 
conflicts of interest between the company and its executives. This calls for demanding personal 
qualities of integrity, courage, common sense and excellent interpersonal, as well as, listening 
and communication skills 
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However, it is acknowledged that non-executive directors who are able to provide independent 
and objective contributions to a board's deliberations, judgment and decisions would contribute 
enormously to good corporate governance which would benefit all stakeholders, in particular 
investors who are not involved in the management of the company. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
OVERVIEW, RECOMMENDATIONS, FINDINGS AND CONCLUDING REMARKS 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this study was to examine the international perspectives on the proper role of the 
independent director in corporate governance. This research is especially timely given that board 
diversity and independence are significant corporate governance issues facing the modern 
corporation. According to McKinsey and Company (2002) investors believe companies should 
create more independent boards and achieve greater boardroom effectiveness through better 
director selection, more disciplined boardroom evaluation processes and greater commitment 
from directors. 
They argue that improvement in the independence of corporate boards ought to yield 
improvements in corporate performance. They contend that independent directors are expected to 
be more effective in monitoring managers, thereby reducing agency costs arising from the 
separation of ownership (shareholders) and control (managers) in the day-to-day company 
management. 
5.2 OVERVIEW OF THE STUDY 
According to Stiles and Taylor (2001), the field of corporate governance has been inundated with 
policy recommendations, as governments and institutional bodies seek ways to make companies 
more accountable and, ultimately, more effective in an increasingly competitive environment. 
The writers posit that many policy theories have had an implicit reliance on agency theory 
assumptions. These assumptions they contend centered on the nature of managerial motivation, 
which, it is claimed, rests on opportunism and self seeking behavior. Much attention has been 
paid to the issue of board composition, by increasing the international awareness of boards to 
appoint independent non-executive directors. 
 Empirical evidence on the association between independent non-executive director’s and firm 
performance is mixed. Some studies have found that having more independent non-executive 
directors on the board improve firm performance Barnhart et al (1994); Daily and Dalton, 
(1992); Schellenger et al., (1989).  
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However, other empirical evidence does suggest that independent non-executive director’s do 
play an important role of shareholder advocate. For example, studies have shown that 
shareholders benefit more when outside independent directors have control of the board in tender 
offers for bidders (Byrd and Hickman 1992) and in hostile takeover threats (Gibbs, 1993).  
Furthermore, an investigation by Beasley (1996) commissioned by the Treadway Commission 
into the governance structures of failed firms indicates that the boards of directors were 
dominated by management and outsiders with special ties to the company or management. 
Beasley (1996) found that independent directors reduce the likelihood of financial statement 
fraud. It would therefore appear; from these studies that independent non-executive director’s do 
monitor and control management in specific contexts such as takeovers and financial statement 
reporting. 
However, it is interesting to note that the Enron board of directors composed of a majority of 
independent directors while the boards’ of WorldCom, and Global Crossing, were composed of a 
majority of management and other non-independent directors (Beasley, 1996). It appears 
therefore that the presence or lack of independent directors did not influence the management of 
these firms. 
5.3 RECOMMENDATIONS 
• As with executive appointments, all board members should be involved in the decision to 
appoint independent non-executive directors. 
• The board should approve standards for determining a director’s independence, taking 
into account the laws that are governing a country, as well as the view of investors and 
other stakeholder groups 
• When considering whether a director is independent the board should also consider 
whether the director has any other relationships, either directly or indirectly, with the 
company’s senior management or other board members that could affect the director’s 
actual or perceived independence. 
• Create and publish corporate governance principles so that everyone from employees to 
potential investors understand the rules under which the company is operating 
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• The primary role of the non-executives should be involvement in board decisions rather 
than to perform roles which would undermine the unitary board concept that is working 
well in the UK. A role that needs to be developed further is acting as promoters of good 
ethical behaviour to ensure that the company is run on behalf of the shareholders as a 
whole.  
• The King report should be kept under regular review so that it is updated for changing 
circumstances, and be in line with international corporate governance standards. 
5.4 FINDINGS 
 Studies by Weisbach (1998), Baysinger and Hoskisson (1990), McNulty and Pettigrew (1999), 
Carpenter and Westhpal (2001), Weir and Lang (2001), styles and Taylor (2001) and Pearce II 
and Zahara reported that boards with a healthy representation of independent non-executive 
directors on the board are associated with better financial performance compared to those with 
no or a smaller percentage of independent non-executive directors. However, there is some 
evidence that having an independent director on the board is correlated with less cases of 
fraudulent financial reporting (Beasley et al ., 2000; Dunn, 2004). Table 5.1 highlights selected 
empirical studies findings that independent directors do strengthen corporate boards. 
According to recent evidence in the UK and elsewhere it would seem that internationally 
companies have made a choice in favour of appointing independent directors rather than 
following some of the other guidelines of corporate governance codes that refer specifically to 
good board practices. 
The study revealed that: 
• Many countries across the continent have adopted a code of Corporate Governance Best 
Practice based on international standards like the South African King report, the UK 
Cadbury report; the Higgs report; the OECD Code and the Commonwealth Secretariat 
Code. 
• A significant number of recent studies find that independent non-executive directors have 
a positive effect on accountability and firm performance. 
 
 
 
 
  
48
•  Non-executive independent directors do appear to strengthen corporate boards; however, 
more needs to be done to re-establish the market’s confidence in corporate South Africa’s 
ability to effectively govern itself. 
• There is convergence to International Accounting Standards: Listed companies 
in South Africa and all over Africa for example Kenya, Tanzania, Botswana, and 
Mauritius are required to use International Accounting Standards. 
5.5 IMPLICATIONS FOR SOUTH AFRICAN BOARDS OF DIRECTORS 
The development of corporate governance in South Africa and across the world has manifested 
itself in a number of interesting ways. Foremost among these has been the changes that the JSE 
has undertaken, 
• By revising its listing rules, which makes a number of the recommendations under the 
second King report mandatory and applies the ‘comply or explain’ principle with respect 
to conformity with the remaining guidelines. 
• The recommendations of South Africa’s second King report on corporate governance 
have been incorporated into legislation and regulations relating to financial markets on 
the grounds that these support prudential conduct.  
• The banking regulator on corporate governance went further, in calling for an inquiry into 
the corporate governance of South Africa’s major banks. This investigation resulted in a 
number of recommendations, which have given rise to significant changes to the Banks 
Act. 
At the same time, the regulations accompanying the PFMA were significantly altered to conform 
to various recommendations contained in the second King Report. This was followed by a 
completely revised protocol on corporate governance for all state-owned enterprises, which 
replaced the earlier policy protocol. The new protocol introduced more comprehensive and 
rigorous guidelines for public sector institutions. Shortly after this government has introduced 
the municipal finance management Act, which imposes significant governance obligations on 
officials and executives associated with municipal financial administration.  
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Since then a serious of statutory interventions and regulations have also been introduced to 
combat money laundering as well as support for stricter anti-corruption measures. This was a 
clear signal from government that corporate governance has been identified as a matter of 
national significance. 
5.6 RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
According to Pettigrew (1992), the central problem with research on corporate governance and 
the Board of Directors has been that the majority of studies have been conducted at one remove 
from board activity. He argues that much energy has been expended in testing theoretical models 
using secondary data, while few descriptive studies have actually been carried out with directors 
themselves, but I would suggest the use of more qualitative data methodologies to investigate 
board processes (Pettigrew, 1992). I believe that such a study methodology can provide us with 
richer forms of data and new tools for analysis to shed light on the complex processes involved 
in the selection of non –executive directors, their roles and functions on corporate boards. 
5.7 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Corporate governance is about the way in which boards oversee the running of a company by its 
managers, and how board members are in turn accountable to shareholders and the company. 
This has implications for company behaviour towards employees, shareholders, customers and 
banks. Good corporate governance plays a vital role in underpinning the integrity and efficiency 
of financial markets. Poor corporate governance weakens a company’s potential and at worst can 
pave the way for financial difficulties and even fraud.  
If companies are well governed, they will usually outperform other companies and will be able to 
attract investors whose support can help to finance further growth (Petra, 2005). 
As discussed previously, director independence is perhaps the most debated corporate 
governance issue faced by today’s organizations. In the current study, we considered 
international perspectives on the proper role of the independent director and the extent to which 
they could make any difference whilst serving on a company’s board of directors.   
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Some studies have shown that firm performance is unaffected by the presence of outside 
independent directors. This would indicate that management is controlling firm performance and 
the decision management function of the board is controlled by management (Petra, 2005). 
 
According to Petra (2005), the above discussion would seem to indicate that outside independent 
directors do play an important role in controlling management (i.e. decision control) in the 
context of specific settings such as takeover threats, CEO compensation, and individual 
nominations to the firm’s board. Only time will tell if the spotlight now shining brightly on 
corporate board rooms will lead to changes that increase investor confidence in corporate 
governance. The research shows overwhelming support for the inclusion of independent 
directors on corporate boards and provide clear guidelines regarding their roles and 
responsibilities as well as what could be expected of them.  The researcher is of the view that 
boards with a healthy representation of independent non-executive directors on the board does 
appear to strengthen corporate boards. 
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Table: 5.1 Selected empirical studies finding that independent directors do strengthen corporate boards 
Authors   Description of study    Major empirical    
         findings 
Schellenger et al.  Advocates of board of director reform suggest  The study finds that there is a 
(1989)   that outsider dominated boards take a more  positive correlation between ratio 
   active role in promoting the financial    of outside directors and dividend 
   performance of the firm.    payout ratios. The findings provide 
         evidence that the composition of  
         the board of directors affects 
         dividend policy. 
Byrd and Hickman The study examines the association between  The study finds that bidding firms     
(1991)   the presence of outside directors and the   on which independent directors           
   returns to shareholders of bidding firms in   hold at least 50% of the seats  
   tender offers.     Have significantly higher returns  
         than other bidders. 
Barnhart et al. (1989) In this paper the researchers attempts to   There is statistically significant    
Determine whether, after controlling  curvilinear relationship between     
for managerial ownership or shares, the  board composition and                  
proportion of independent outside   performance, and conclude 
directors is related to overall performance.  that board composition and overall   
         performance is related. 
 
Beasley (1996)  This study empirically tests the prediction  Results from logit regression  
   that the inclusion of larger proportions of  analysis of 75 fraud and 75 no- 
   independent outside directors on the board  fraud firms indicate that no-fraud 
   of directors significantly reduces the likelihood firms have board with significantly 
   of financial statement fraud.   Higher percentages of independent   
         directors than fraud firms. 
Dechow et al. (1996) This study investigates firms subject to  It was found that an important  
   accounting enforcement actions by the SEC  motivation for earnings mani- 
   for alleged violations of generally accepted  pulation is the desire to attract  
   accounting principles.    External financing at lower  
         cost. According to the researchers 
         firms manipulating earnings are 
         more likely to : 1. Have boards of 
         directors dominated by manage- 
         ment, and 2. Have a chief executive 
         officer who simultaneously serves  
         chairman of the board. 
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Table: 5.1 Selected empirical studies finding that independent directors do strengthen corporate boards 
Authors   Description of study    Major emperical   
         Findings 
Shivdasani and   The researchers study whether CEO involve- It was found that companies are    
Yermack (1998)  ment in the selection of new directors  more likely to appoint grey out- 
   Influences the quality of appointments to the  side directors who have conflicts 
   board of directors.    of interests and less likely to  
         appoint independent outsiders 
         under these conditions, and are less 
         likely to make pivotal appointments 
         that give the board a majority of  
         independent outsiders.  
 
Carcello and Neal This study examines the relation between  The researchers found an inverse  
(2000)   the composition of financially distressed   relation between the likelihood of  
  firms, audit committees and the likelihood  receiving a going concern report 
   of receiving going concern reports.   and the percentage of affiliated   
         directors on the audit committee. 
         Their findings are consistent with 
         the BRC’s (1999) recent  
recommendations for completely 
independent audit committees. 
              
Dehaene and  In this paper, the researchers analyzed the   Through statistical calculations, the  
Ooghe (2001)  composition of directors in a sample of  authors found that board size and 
   122 Belgian companies and verified whether  percentage of outside directors are 
   this composition has an impact on the   positively related to company size 
   performance of the firm, as measured by returns  and differ significantly across 
   on equity and assets.    Industries. They also found a  
         significantly positive relationship 
         between the number of external 
         directors and return on equity, and 
         where the functions of chairman  
         and chief executive are combined, 
         the return on assets is significantly 
         higher. 
 
Yoshikawa and Phan This paper explores the performance impact  They found that participation of 
(2003)   of recent changes in foreign shareholdings and independent outside directors in  
   boardroom reforms in Japan.   Strategic decision making was 
         associated with positive stock 
         returns.    
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Table: 5.1 Selected empirical studies finding that independent directors do strengthen corporate boards 
Authors   Description of study    Major empirical    
         findings 
Belden et al.  The researcher hypostasized that     Using sophisticated statistical   
(2005)   firms with a larger share of    analysis and a database of over 500 
   Independent outside directors on their  firms, she finds that companies  
   Boards pay higher dividends, an action   with more independent outside 
   They say that reduces agency cost.   Directors pay higher dividends. 
 
Helland and Sykuta The researchers examine the relative likelihood They found that companies that are 
(2005)   of a firm being a defendant in securities litigation the target of shareholder litigation  
   based on such traditional measures of board  have systematically higher  
   effectiveness as the insider outsider composition percentages of inside directors. The  
   of the board controlling for firm value, previous results suggests that boards with  
   unfavourable financial audit, year and industry. Higher proportions of outside 
         directors do a better job of  
         monitoring management. 
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